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Abstract 
This note corrects the matching function proposed by Albrecht et al. [Econ. Lett. 78 
(2003) 67]. It also verifies that the limiting result given in that note is correct. 
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1. Introduction 
Albrecht et al. (2003a) (hereafter AGV, 2003a) proposed a generalization of the urn-
ball matching function allowing for more than one application per worker. Suppose 
there are u unemployed workers and v vacancies. Each unemployed worker submits 
a applications with a {1,2,…, v} given. These applications are randomly distributed 
across the v vacancies with the proviso that any particular worker sends at most one 
application to any particular vacancy. Each vacancy (among those that received at 
least one application) then chooses one application at random and offers that 
applicant a job. A worker may get more than one offer. In that case, the worker 
accepts one of the offers at random. 
Let M(u, v; a) be the expected number of matches, i.e., the expected number of 
accepted offers. Albrecht et al. (2003a) presents expressions for M(u, v; a) and for 
. Tan (2003) points out that the Albrecht et al. (2003a) 
expression for M(u, v; a) is incorrect for a {2,…, v−1}, u and v finite, and presents a 
corrected expression. Albrecht et al. (2003b) (hereafter AGV, 2003b) presents a 
corrected expression for M(u, v; 2) and proves that the Albrecht et al. (2003a) 
expression for m(θ; a) is correct. This note summarizes the independently derived 
results of Albrecht et al. (2003b) and Tan (2003). 1 
The problem in the finite case can be understood when a=2. Consider any vacancy 
to which an unemployed worker applies. The number of competitors the worker has 
at this vacancy is . One can then compute the probability that the worker 
fails to receive an offer at this vacancy. Similarly, the number of competitors at the 
other vacancy to which this worker applies is . Again, one can compute 
the probability that the worker fails to receive an offer from this vacancy. The 
probability that a worker receives at least one offer equals 1 minus the probability he 
or she receives no offers. The mistake in the work of Albrecht et al. (2003a) was to 
assume (implicitly) that the probability a worker receives no offers equals the 
probability that his first application doesn't generate an offer times the probability that 
his second application does not generate an offer. However, the indicator random 
variables, “first application leads to an offer” and “second application leads to an 
offer” are not independent. Equivalently, the numbers of competitors that a worker 
has at the two vacancies are not independent. Note that this problem does not arise 
when a=1 or a=v. 
2. The finite case 
Consider a=2. Then M(u, v; 2)=u (1−Ψ), where 
 is the probability that neither of a worker's applications is successful. The term 
 
is the probability that the worker has i competitors at the first vacancy to which he 
applies, and 
 
is the conditional probability that the worker has j competitors at the second vacancy 
to which he applies given i. The summation over z in the expression for Δ2(i,j) 
accounts for the fact that there may be some competitors who apply to both of the 
vacancies to which the worker in question applies. The presentation given here is 
essentially that of Tan (2003). Albrecht et al. (2003b) derives the joint probability 
distribution for i and j directly. Of course, since P[I=i, J=j]=Δ1(i)Δ2(i, j), the two 
approaches are equivalent. Details are given in our two papers.  
Now consider any fixed a {2,…, v−1}. Then M(u, v; a)=u (1−Ψ), where 
 
Here Δ3(i, j, k) is the conditional probability that the worker has k competitors at the 
third vacancy to which he applies given i and j,…, and Δa(i, j, k,…, l) is the conditional 
probability that the worker has l competitors at the last vacancy to which he applies 
given i, j, k,… Expressions for the conditional probabilities are given by Tan (2003).  
3. The limiting case 
The above formula for M(u, v; a), although complicated, reduces in the limit to the 
simple expression given by Albrecht et al. (2003a), namely, 
 
The derivation of the above expression is simplest to explain in the case of a=2. The 
key is to show that in the limit, I and J are independent, so that P[I=i, J=j]=P[I=i]P[J=j]. 
The algebra underlying this result uses the fact that for large u and v, the probability 
that any one worker will compete with another worker on more than one vacancy at a 
time is close to zero. Since the marginal distributions for I and J are each , 
we use the standard result on the Poisson as the limit of a binomial to show that 
 
where 
 
Then, we have 
 
To extend the limiting argument from the case of a=2 to the general case of a {2,…, 
A}, where A is an arbitrary (but fixed) number of applications, we need to show that in 
the limit, the probability that any competitor applies to two or more of the vacancies to 
which an individual has applied is zero. The intuition is that in a large labor market, 
the outcome of a worker's application to any one vacancy tells us next to nothing 
about whether or not his other applications will succeed. The derivation is basically 
the same as the one used for a=2. We show that the numbers of competitors at the a 
vacancies to which the worker applies are approximately independently and 
identically distributed random variables. Then, in the limit, we have shown 
that the joint probability is the product of a independent Poissons, each with 
parameter a/θ. Taking the limit as u, v→∞ with v/u=θ gives the Albrecht et al. (2003a) 
expression for m(θ; a). The details are given by Albrecht et al. (2003b). 
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